U.C.C. Article 2A: Distinguishing Between True Leases and Secured Sales by Paglia, Laura J.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 63 
Number 1 Volume 63, Fall 1988, Number 1 Article 3 
April 2012 
U.C.C. Article 2A: Distinguishing Between True Leases and 
Secured Sales 
Laura J. Paglia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Paglia, Laura J. (1988) "U.C.C. Article 2A: Distinguishing Between True Leases and Secured Sales," St. 
John's Law Review: Vol. 63 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol63/iss1/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
U.C.C. ARTICLE 2A: DISTINGUISHING
BETWEEN TRUE LEASES AND SECURED
SALES
Leases of personal property have been employed with increas-
ing frequency in modern commercial transactions.1 Courts have ad-
vanced several diverse interpretations regarding the proper treat-
ment of such leases.2 Currently, guided by common law precepts,
disputes involving the leasing of chattels are often resolved by ap-
plying legal principles set forth in article 2 (sales) and article 9
(secured transactions) of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
"Code").3 Since neither article 2 nor article 9 was specifically in-
tended to regulate lease transactions, the prevalence of conflict in
current law is not surprising.4 To remedy the disagreement which
' See Hazard, Foreword to U.C.C. art. 2A (1987). While leases of consumer goods such
as automobiles have become somewhat more common, growth in the area of equipment leas-
ing has been tremendous. See Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus.
LAW. 1605, 1606 (1981). The term "equipment lease" generally indicates a long-term agree-
ment which is often used as a substitute for the purchase of costly business equipment. Id.
The increased utilization of this type of transaction has been largely influenced by federal
income tax considerations. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., A CoMPETI-
TIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. EQUIPMENT LEASING INDuSTRY 6-8 (1985) [hereinafter CoMPmI-
Tv ASSESSMENT].
The domestic market for equipment leasing grew from about $26.5 billion in 1978 to an
estimated $61.2 billion in 1983, an average annual growth rate of 18.2%. Id. at 3-4. As a
percentage of capital equipment investment, leasing increased approximately 12% during
that period. Id. at 3. In 1983, leases of equipment represented the largest source of funds for
capital investment. Id. at 3, 5.
' See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
' See Hazard, Foreword to U.C.C. art. 2A (1987); Mooney, supra note 1, at 1608 & n.14.
See Hazard, Foreword to U.C.C. art. 2A (1987). "The legal rules and concepts derived
from these sources imperfectly fit a [lease] transaction .... A statute directly addressing
the personal property lease is therefore appropriate." Id. Article 2 is a modernized version
of the Uniform Sales Act. U.C.C. § 2-101 official comment (1987). Although courts and com-
mentators have advanced various interpretations of its scope, article 2 was primarily in-
tended to govern the law of sales. See id. § 2-101 (short title of article is "Sales"); id. § 2-102
official comment (although security interests are specifically excluded from article's scope,
sales aspects of such transactions are included); see also 0 J & C Co. v. General Hosp.
Leasing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (article 2 is expressly limited to
sales).
Article 9 applies primarily to transactions creating security interests in personal prop-
erty. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1987). Whether article 9 governs a given lease transaction, there-
fore, depends upon whether a security interest as defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987), has
been created. Id. § 9-102 official comment.
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has resulted, the American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") have approved an amendment to the Code, including
an entirely new article-article 2A-governing leases of personal
property.' In addition, several amendments necessary to bring ex-
isting Code provisions into conformity with the new article have
been adopted.' The most significant of the conforming amend-
ments is the substantial revision of section 1-201(37). 7 This defini-
tional provision has been expanded considerably in an effort to
clarify the distinction between those lease agreements which create
"security interests" and those which do not.'
Among the reasons for the promulgation of article 2A was the
desire to resolve certain basic issues,9 such as the appropriate legal
definition of a lease.10 The new article contains detailed provisions
' Hazard, Foreward to U.C.C. art. 2A (1987). Before it was included as an amendment
to the Code, article 2A was proposed as the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act. U.C.C.
§ 2A-101 official comment (1987). NCCUSL approved and recommended the substance of
the new article in August 1986; ALI did the same in May 1987. Id. NCCUSL approved the
final text of article 2A in August 1987. Id. The new article has been introduced in the state
legislatures of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington. Huddleson, Old
Wine in New Bottles: U.C.C. Article 2A-Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 615, 618 & n.5 (1988). To
date, however, article 2A has been enacted only in Oklahoma. Id.; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12A, §§ 2A-101-2A-531 (West Supp. 1989).
1 See U.C.C. §§ 1-105(2), 1-201(37), 9-113 (1987). The amendment to section 1-105(2)
adds two provisions of article 2A to its list of provisions superseding contrary agreement by
the parties. See id. § 1-105(2). Section 9-113, which eliminated the need for filing a security
agreement and provided for the secured party's rights to be governed by article 2 when a
security interest arose solely under a sale, has been extended to include security interests
arising under article 2A. See id. conforming amendment to § 9-113. For a discussion of the
amendment to section 1-201(37), see infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
I See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987). While the amendments to sections 1-105(2) and 9-113
simply supply language which broadens the scope of those sections to apply to certain provi-
sions of article 2A, the revision of section 1-201(37) contains significant changes to the defi-
nition of a security interest. See id. & official comment.
' See id. & official comment. The past definition of security interest identified one situ-
ation where a lease created a security interest and another in which a security interest did
not necessarily arise. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978). The amended subsection describes four
situations in which a lease agreement automatically constitutes a security interest. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987). The amended provision further provides that a transaction does
not create a security interest simply because it contains certain specified characteristics. See
id. In addition, the amendment lists definitions and rules of construction. See id. For a
discussion of specific aspects of the amendment, see infra notes 37-40 and accompanying
text.
' See U.C.C. § 2A-101 official comment (1987).
10 See id. The common law did not provide an adequate method for determining
whether a given transaction is a true lease. See id. § 1-201(37) official comment. Further, the
definition of security interest set forth in the past version of section 1-201(37) gave little
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assigning specific meanings to numerous terms pertaining to lease
transactions.1 Another important point addressed by article 2A is
the existence and effect of express and implied warranties with re-
spect to leased goods.12 In addition, part 5 of the new article
speaks to the rights and obligations of the parties upon default,
delineating remedies for both the lessee and the lessor.13
This Note will discuss the importance of clearly defining the
term "lease." Following a review of judicial interpretations of the
term, the new definitional provisions will be analyzed, with empha-
sis on the distinction between transactions creating true leases and
those creating security interests. Findlly, this Note will consider
the significance of the term "nominal consideration," which has
played an important role in judicial efforts to make this
distinction.
I. THE MEANING OF "LEASE"
A. The Importance of a Clear Definition
Article 2A "applies to any transaction, regardless of form, that
creates a lease."14 It is therefore necessary to make a preliminary
determination concerning the nature of a particular transaction
before treating it in accordance with the dictates of the new arti-
cle. 5 The scope of article 2A is broadly stated because it is in-
tended to reach a wide range of lease transactions, from the sim-
help in making such a determination, and had been described as "vague and outmoded." Id.
The changes to this provision seek to "draw a sharper line" between true leases and security
interests. Id. Some commentators have suggested that the drafters failed to identify a bright
line to guide courts in making determinations in this area. See McLaughlin & Cohen, 'Karl's
Kode' Revised, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
21 See U.C.C. § 2A-103 (1987). Section 2A-103 definitional coverage includes: consumer
lease, finance lease, installment lease contract, lease, lease agreement, lease contract, lease-
hold interest, lessee, lessee in the ordinary course of business, lessor, lessor's residual inter-
est, merchant lessee, and sublease. Id.; see also infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text
(discussing meaning of lease under new article).
12 See U.C.C. § 2A-101 official comment (1987). The law of warranty for leased goods
has long been uncertain. See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales
Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653, 653 (1957).
Is See U.C.C. §§ 2A-501-2A-531 & 2A-101 official comment (1987). The majority of
the provisions in this part are analogous to the remedy provisions for sales contracts, which
are set forth in parts six and seven of article 2. Cf. id. §§ 2-601-2-725.
14 Id. § 2A-102.
15 See id. If the transaction is a lease of goods, it will be governed by the new article.
See id. If, however, it is found to be a sale or secured transaction, articles 2 and 9 will
control. See supra note 4.
1988]
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plest rental agreements to the most complex business ventures."6
However, application is limited to leases of goods, and does not
extend to sales or security interests. 7 Distinguishing between these
different forms of doing business, therefore, will have a significant
impact on the rights and remedies of the various parties involved."8
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Term "Lease"
Courts have traditionally encountered difficulty in properly
classifying transactions which parties have labeled leases.' 9 A re-
curring problem involves drawing a distinction between a true
lease, and a transaction which actually creates a security interest
but is disguised as a lease.2 0 The past definition of security interest
16 U.C.C. § 2A-102 official comment (1987). In addition, if the parties to such a transac-
tion have agreed that article 2A will govern, their intentions should be enforced by the
court. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes a lease, see infra notes 36-40 and accompany-
ing text.
17 U.C.C. § 2A-102 official comment (1987). "Goods" are defined as "all things that are
movable at the time of identification to the lease contract, or are fixtures." Id. § 2A-103(h).
Another potential restriction on the applicability of the article to lease transactions is con-
trary agreement by the parties. See id. § 2A-102 official comment. Consistent with the spirit
of the Code, freedom of contract has been preserved, allowing the parties to determine the
effect of their agreement. See id. By analogy, however, courts are permitted to apply princi-
ples of article 2A to leases of personal property other than goods. See id.
18 See Cohen, McLaughlin & Zaretsky, "Lease" or "Security Interest"? Impending
Clarification, 1 CoM. L. REP. 198, 199 (1987). Where the transaction is a true lease, "'[o]n
common law theory, the lessor, since he has not parted with title, is entitled to full protec-
tion against the lessee's creditors and trustee in bankruptcy.'" U.C.C. § 1-201(37) official
comment (1987) (quoting 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.6, at
76 (1965)). Further, the distinction between these types of transactions has significance in
connection with "state usury laws; third party rights; [and] Code filing requirements." Hud-
dleson, UCC Article 2A: Leases, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 205, 206
(1987).
19 See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) official comment (1987); see also Cohen, McLaughlin & Za-
retsky, supra note 18, at 199-200 (considerable confusion exists in determining meaning of
"lease"). Commentators have noted the existing confusion, recognizing the desirability of
uniform treatment in this area. See Coogan, Is There a Difference Between a Long-Term
Lease and an Installment Sale of Personal Property?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1036, 1057-58
(1981).
" See Mooney, supra note 1, at 1610 & n.23. Due to the inherent difficulties presented
by attempting to distinguish these transactions, some commentators have suggested that
little consequence should be attached to the distinction. See Ayer, Further Thoughts on
Lease and Sale, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 341, 354-55. But see Boss, Leases and Sales: Ne'er or
Where Shall the Twain Meet?, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 357, 360 (criticizing Professor Ayer's
notion that lease-sale distinction is meaningless). The distinction is significant because the
body of commercial law that controls a given situation is dependent on the nature of the
transaction. See Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment
Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 446, 446. Courts have recognized that a purported lease agree-
ment which is used to disguise another type of transaction should be subject to the same
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found in section 1-201(37) offered little guidance for courts ad-
dressing this issue, and no judicial standard for making such a
classification has emerged.2' It is well settled that this determina-
tion must be made on a case by case basis as the particular facts
22require. Courts have identified, however, an array of factors to
consider in characterizing these transactions, 3 focusing primarily
on the parties' intentions.2 '
One of the primary considerations in determining the nature
of a transaction is the possibility that the lessee will eventually
own the leased goods.25 An agreement is most appropriately classi-
analysis it would have undergone if the transaction's true nature had been disclosed. See,
e.g., Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Way, 263 S.C. 101, 108, 208 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1974)
(article 2 applies to sale disguised as lease).
21 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) official comment (1987). The last two sentences of the 1978 ver-
sion of section 1-201(37), which stated that the mere inclusion of a purchase option does not
make a lease one intended for security but the fact that the lessee shall become owner or
has an option to become the owner for no or nominal consideration does make it one in-
tended for security, further added to the confusion surrounding the lease-security interest
issue. Id.; see also Cohen, McLaughlin & Zaretsky, supra note 18, at 199 (statutory defini-
tion under 1978 Code is "of limited usefulness").
The courts' failure to enunciate a standard has resulted in substantial discordance with
respect to this issue. See Coogan, Leasing and the Uniform Commercial Code, in EQUIP-
iENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 681, 692 (2d ed. 1980); Mooney, supra note 1, at 1613.
22 See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987). "Whether a transaction creates a lease or security
interest is determined by the facts of each case. . . ." Id.; see also Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v.
Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 289, 250 A.2d 246, 248 (1969) (facts are controlling to
show parties' intent) (quoting In re Alpha Creamery Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
794, 797 (W.D. Mich. 1967)); IFG Leasing Co. v. Schultz, 217 Mont. 434, 436, 705 P.2d 576,
577 (1985) (facts of case determine character of transaction). Due to the inadequate stan-
dards for evaluating the facts, classification has been difficult. See Coogan, supra note 21, at
692.
21 See Lease Fin., Inc. v. Burger, 40 Colo. App. 107, 111, 575 P.2d 857, 859-60 (1977);
Crest Inv. Trust, 252 Md. at 289, 250 A.2d at 248 (quoting In re Alpha Creamery Co., 4
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 794, 797-98 (W.D. Mich. 1967)); All-States Leasing Co. v.
Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 327, 600 P.2d 899, 904 (1979); see also infra notes 25-34 and accom-
panying text (discussing various factors considered).
24 See Lease Fin., 40 Colo. App. at 111, 575 P.2d at 859; Citizens & S. Equip. Leasing v.
Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 144 Ga. App. 800, 805, 243 S.E.2d 243, 247 (1978); Trans-
continental Refrigeration Co. v. Figgins, 179 Mont. 12, 18, 585 P.2d 1301, 1305 (1978). Some
courts focus on the purpose of the agreement to discern the parties' intent, rather than the
language employed by the parties. See, e.g., Rushton v. Shea, 419 F. Supp. 1349, 1365 (D.
Del. 1976); Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 391, 215 S.E.2d 10, 17
(1975). But see In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 826 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (language
of lease indicative of intent), afl'd sub. nom. Sanders v. National Acceptance Co. of Am., 383
F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Hawkland, supra note 20, at 448 (courts likely to
enforce parties' declaration that transaction creates security interest).
Under section 1-201(37), objective factors, rather than subjective intent, control. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) official comment (1987); infra note 42 and accompanying text.
25 See All-States Leasing, 42 Or. App. at 327, 600 P.2d at 904; Hawkland, supra note
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fled as a sale where its terms require the lessee to become owner of
the goods.2" Alternatively, a mere option to acquire the leased
goods upon expiration of the lease term does not transform the
lease agreement into a contract of sale. If, however, the lessee has
the opportunity to become the owner of the leased goods for nomi-
nal or no additional consideration, then the transaction will likely
be deemed a sale.2" Attempts to formulate a workable standard for
20, at 448-49. If title is to pass to the lessee, the transaction is likely to constitute a sale. See
Transcontinental Refrigeration, 179 Mont. at 17, 585 P.2d at 1304 (sale is a "'passing of
title from the seller to the buyer'" (quoting U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978))). Further, some courts
consider the existence of a lessee's equity interest in the property as significant in drawing
the lease-sale-security interest distinction. See In re Tillery, 571 F.2d 1361, 1365 (5th Cir.
1978); In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342, 345-46 (E.D. Pa.
1963); Hill v. Bentco Leasing, Inc., 288 Ark. 623, 625, 708 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1986).
2 See G.R. Pierce v. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 371, 372, 235 S.E.2d 752, 754
(1977); Redfern Meats, 134 Ga. App. at 391, 215 S.E.2d at 17-18. If the lessee is obligated to
return the goods to the lessor at termination of the lease period, and the goods are still
valuable, then the lessor has a meaningful residual interest and the transaction is more
likely to be recognized as a true lease. See In re Samoset Assocs., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 510, 516 (D. Me. 1978).
Some lease agreements require the lessee to pay a sum that approximates the value of
the goods, regardless of whether the lessee will ever acquire an ownership interest in the
property. Some courts have held that such "full-payout" leases automatically create security
interests. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 252, 259 (D.N.J. 1976) (rental payments far in excess of value of leased
property); Citizens & S. Equip. Leasing, 144 Ga. App. at 807, 243 S.E.2d at 248 (accelerated
rentals approximate purchase price); see also Hawkland, supra note 20, at 448-49 (full-pay-
out lease probably deemed security absent lessor's retention of residual interest); cf. Rush-
ton, 419 F. Supp. at 1365 (obligation to pay value of goods is generally prerequisite of sale
but does not "compel such a finding"). However, these decisions have been subject to criti-
cism. See Burke, Secured Transactions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1547, 1549-50 (1979); Burke, Secured
Transactions, 32 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1136-37 (1977).
27 See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987); In re Tillery, 571 F.2d at 1366; In re Alpha Creamery
Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 794, 799 (W.D. Mich. 1967); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v.
Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 289, 250 A.2d 246, 248 (1969); All-States Leasing, 42
Or. App. at 327, 600 P.2d at 904.
Some courts have held that a mere option to purchase goods cannot transform a lease
into a security interest because the term "security interest" contemplates the performance
of an obligation. See, e.g., RCA Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 513 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1974); see
also Brokers Leasing Corp. v. Standard Pipeline Coating Co., 602 S.W.2d 278, 280-81 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1980) (option, rather than obligation, to purchase does not create sale).
28 See Citicorp Leasing, Inc. v. Allied Inst. Distrib., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 511, 515-16
(W.D. Okla. 1977); Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Or. 573, 575-76, 500 P.2d
708, 710 (1972); FMA Fin. Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1979); Lectro
Management, Inc. v. Freeman, Everett & Co., 135 Vt. 213, 216-17, 373 A.2d 544, 546 (1977).
Furthermore, where exercise of the option is the "only sensible course," the transaction
is likely to be treated as one intended to create a security interest. See, e.g., Percival Constr.
Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 172 (10th Cir. 1976); Crest Inv. Trust,
252 Md. at 289, 250 A.2d at 248; Peco, 262 Or. at 576, 500 P.2d at 710; FMA Fin. Corp., 590
P.2d at 806.
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determining nominality of consideration have been largely unsuc-
cessful.29 The absence of a purchase option has been given some
attention, but generally is not determinative of a transaction's
nature.30
Courts have enunciated a miscellany of factors which may aid
in the categorization of these transactions 1 For example, it has
been suggested that a conditional sale is intended where total
rental payments exceed the value of the leased goods;32 where the
term of lease is longer than the estimated useful life of the prop-
erty;33 or where the lease is being employed as a financing device.
3 4
C. Article 2A Effect on the Lease-Sale-Security Interest
Distinction
One of the most compelling reasons behind the recommenda-
tion of article 2A was the need to "sharpen the line" between pure
29 See Mooney, supra note 1, at 1611. Many methods for determining whether or not
consideration is nominal have been advanced. Id.; see infra notes 56-67 and accompanying
text.
" See, e.g., In re Tillery, 571 F.2d 1361, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978) (absence of option does
not make transaction lease); In re Samoset Assocs., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 514-
15 (security interest may exist without option); Hill v. Bentco Leasing, Inc., 288 Ark. 623,
626, 708 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1986) (absence of option not conclusive); Barco Auto Leasing
Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, Inc., 125 Misc. 2d 68, 70, 478 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1984) (same). But see IFG Leasing Co. v. Schultz, 217 Mont. 434, 436, 705 P.2d
576, 577 (1985) (court found true lease because lessee had no option to obtain title to prop-
erty at no additional charge upon expiration of lease term).
31 See J.L. Teel Co. v. Houston United Sales, 491 So. 2d 851, 858 (Miss. 1985); All-
States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 327, 600 P.2d 899, 904 (1979). These considera-
tions include which party bears the risk of loss, which party is responsible for charges inci-
dent to possession or ownership, and the purpose for which the property was purchased by
the lessor. See Hill, 288 Ark. at 625, 708 S.W.2d at 609; J.L. Teel, 491 So. 2d at 858; All-
States Leasing, 42 Or. App. at 327, 600 P.2d at 904; Brokers Leasing, 602 S.W.2d at 281;
Mooney, supra note 1, at 1612; infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
32 See National Equip. Rental v. Priority Elecs. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 236, 239 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (citing Leasing Service Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 252 (D.N.J. 1976)); see also supra note 26 (discussing full-payout leases).
33 See In re Altanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 826 (N.D. Ga. 1966), aff'd sub. nom.
Sanders v. National Acceptance Co. of Am., 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); J.L.
Teel, 491 So. 2d at 858.
34 See All-States Leasing, 42 Or. App. at 327, 600 P.2d at 904-05 (financing lessor sta-
tus one factor to consider); Equico Lessors, Inc. v. Tow, 34 Wash. App. 333, 340, 661 P.2d
597, 601 (1983) (financing lease treated differently than normal operating lease). A financing
lease is a transaction in which the lessor procures the goods for the express purpose of
leasing them to the lessee. Id. The lessor's role is primarily to enable the lessee to obtain
goods which he could not otherwise obtain. Id. The financing lessor usually has no expertise
with respect to the goods, and normally has limited, if any, contact with them. See generally
P. NEVrrr & F. FABozzi, EQuniazET LF sINo 78-100 (2d ed. 1985).
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leases and certain secured transactions.3 5 To effectuate this objec-
tive, the new article includes an assortment of definitional provi-
sions clarifying words and phrases commonly associated with
leases." For example, the fundamental term "lease" is defined as a
"transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in
return for consideration. ' -7 Further, the definition expressly ex-
cludes sales and security interests from its ambit.3 8 Section 1-
201(37) elaborates on the meaning of "security interest" by identi-
fying four situations which constitute security interests.3 " Addi-
tionally, the new definitional section provides that a transaction
does not constitute a security interest merely because it has certain
enumerated characteristics. ° According to the new section, the
" See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) official comment (1987); supra note 10 and accompanying
text; see also U.C.C. § 2A-103(j) official comment (1987) (comprehensive rationale for fur-
ther refining lease-security interest dichotomy).
11 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
37 U.C.C. § 2A-103(j) (1987). The term "lease" includes a sublease, unless such a con-
struction is clearly inconsistent with the context of the transaction. Id. The modern defini-
tion has its origin in the common-law understanding of a lease. See id. § 2A-103(j) official
comment.
Id. § 2A-103(j).
" Id. § 1-201(37) official comment. According to the new definition, a transaction cre-
ates a security interest if the lessee must pay for the right to use and possess the goods as an
obligation for the term of the lease which the lessee cannot terminate, and one of the follow-
ing four situations exists:
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining eco-
nomic life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the
goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of
the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration
upon compliance with the lease agreement, or
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional
consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the
lease agreement.
Id. § 1-201(37).
40 See id. The new definition states that a security interest is not created merely be-
cause a transaction provides any of the following:
(a) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay the lessor
for the right to possession and use of the goods is substantially equal to or is
greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time the lease is entered
into,
(b) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or agrees to pay taxes, insurance,
filing, recording, or registration fees, or service or maintenance costs with re-
spect to the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the
goods,
(d) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is equal to or
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particular facts of each case still control the characterization of a
given transaction.41 However, the new provision offers greater guid-
ance to courts because it places emphasis on the economic realities
of the deal rather than the parties' subjective intent.42 In addition,
the amended provision contains guidelines for ascertaining a func-
tional standard of nominality.43 Although these guidelines are
somewhat helpful, it is evident that a gap exists between option
prices which are clearly nominal and those which are not.44 Where
the guidelines are not of assistance, the drafters suggest that the
lease-security interest distinction be based on the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction.45 It is submitted that this
reference to a determination on the facts of each case will causejudges and practitioners to resort to pre-article 2A standards of
classification, which have proven inadequate. Furthermore, it is
suggested that the guidelines advanced apply largely to cases
greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for the use of the
goods for the term of the renewal at the time the option is to be performed, or
(e) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for a fixed price
that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value of
the goods at the time the option is to be performed.
Id.
41 Id.
42 See id. § 1-201(37) official comment. Attempts to ascertain parties' intent led courts
to rely on factors that did not validly distinguish between sales and leases. Id. The recently
amended section 1-201(37) shifts the focus away from subjective intent and towards eco-
nomic analyses. See id.; see also Huddleson, supra note 18, at 207 (under § 1-201(37), objec-
tive factors control lease-sale distinction). Prior to the codification of article 2A, some courts
had suggested that economic factors should control. See, e.g., Rushton v. Shea, 419 F. Supp.
1349, 1365 (D. Del. 1976) (economic consequences determine whether lessor retained owner-
ship or security interest); In re Samoset Assocs., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 510, 512-
13 (D. Me. 1978) (court must rely on economic circumstances rather than name parties give
transaction in making lease-sale distinction).
43 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987). The section provides:
For purposes of this subsection (37):
(x) Additional consideration is not nominal if (i) when the option to renew the
lease is granted to the lessee the rent is stated to be the fair market rent for
the use of the goods for the term of the renewal determined at the time the
option is to be performed, or (ii) when the option to become the owner of the
goods is granted to the lessee the price is stated to be fair market value of the
goods determined at the time the option is to be performed. Additional con-
sideration is nominal if it is less than the lessee's reasonably predictable cost
of performing under the lease agreement if the option is not exercised.
Id.
44 See id. § 1-201(37) official comment. The drafters acknowledged the existence of this
gap where the consideration is less than fair market value, yet not so insignificant as to be
deemed nominal. Id.
45 Id.
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where classification is not a difficult task. The more difficult cases
will inevitably fall into the gap.
Recognizing the impossibility of addressing every conceivable
fact pattern, the drafters left further development in this area to
the courts.46 It is submitted that while the new provision is benefi-
cial to the extent that it promotes uniformity of treatment for the
situations covered, judicial discordance will continue until the term
"nominal consideration" is more precisely defined.
II. NOMINAL CONSIDERATION
Whether or not a transaction will be classified as a lease or a
secured sale often depends on the meaning that is attached to the
term "nominal consideration."47 For example, an option to
purchase goods at the end of a lease term is considered to create a
security interest only if the purchase price is nominal.4 8 Although
amended section 1-201(37) provides guidelines for determining
what constitutes nominal consideration, formulation of a more def-
inite standard is needed.4 9 The proffered guidelines state that an
option price equal to the goods' fair market value at the time the
option is exercised is not nominal.5 0 The section further sets forth
4" Id. The drafters felt that further elaboration on the definition of security interest
would unnecessarily complicate the definition. Id.
"I See id. § 1-201(37); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing lessee's
option to buy for nominal or no additional consideration).
48 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987).
41 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
60 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987). Many courts have recognized the importance of the fair
market value of the leased property in determining nominality. See infra note 61 and ac-
companying text. One federal court, however, has held that an option price may be nominal
even if it is equivalent to the fair market value of the goods at the end of the lease term. See
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Priority Elecs. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 236, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
The court pointed out that goods which are almost worthless at the end of the lease term
could be sold at a fair market value of, for example, one dollar, which in the court's view
would be nominal. Id. Moreover, the court was uncomfortable with the practical conse-
quence that parties could determine the nature of a transaction simply by setting an option
price equal to the goods' value at the end of the term. Id.
Further, it is noteworthy that this guideline does not mandate that an option price be
equal to the goods' fair market value in order not to be considered nominal. See U.C.C. § 1-
201(37) (1987). Rather, it leaves room for option prices below fair market value to be classi-
fied as nominal or not according to the facts and circumstances of each case. See id.; see
also supra text accompanying note 45 (distinction may be fact sensitive). Interestingly, ac-
cording to guidelines promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service, for federal tax purposes
a transaction will not be considered a true lease if the lessee is able to purchase the equip-
ment at the end of the term for any price which is less than its fair market value. See
CoMPETiTIV ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 7.
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the rule that additional consideration which is less than the
lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease
if the option is not exercised constitutes nominal consideration.51
Since cases which do not fit neatly within these guidelines will
likely be analyzed with reference to pre-2A standards of nominal-
ity, an examination of prior case law is essential.52
Nominal consideration has been described as "any amount
which is trivial compared with the value or the purchase price of
the goods." 3 Case law has utilized a variety of tests in determining
nominality, most of which are based on a comparison of the option
price and some other ascertainable value connected with the trans-
action. 4 Once the appropriate value to which the consideration
will be compared is selected, the inquiry usually focuses upon the
relation which the option price bears to this value.5
One of the comparisons frequently employed in determining
nominality is that between the option price and the list price or
original cost of acquisition of the property.56 Some courts have ap-
plied the rule of thumb that an option price of less than twenty-
five percent of the goods' list price constitutes nominal considera-
tion. 7 Others have noted that an option price equal to ten percent
of the lessor's cost is sufficiently insignificant to be considered
nominal.5 8 Another way courts have approached the issue of ade-
1 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987); see supra note 43.
52 See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
13 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201:270, at 322 (3d ed. 1981).
See Mooney, supra note 1, at 1611; see also infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text
(discussing various approaches used by courts to determine if consideration is nominal).
:5 See Mooney, supra note 1, at 1611.
6 See, e.g., In re Samoset Assocs., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 510, 513 (D. Me.
1978) (using purchase price or cost of acquisition as point of reference); FMA Fin. Corp. v.
Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1979) (comparing, among other things, lessor's cost
of property to option price).
As one alternative for determining nominality, the drafters of article 2A considered a
comparison between the option price and some minimum absolute percentage of the original
value of the goods. See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 628; see also infra note 68 and accom-
panying text (discussing other test contemplated by the drafters).
57 See, e.g., In re Alpha Creamery Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 794, 797-98
(W.D. Mich. 1967) (thirty-two percent option price held not nominal); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc.
v. Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 288, 250 A.2d 246, 248-49 (1969) (fifty-five percent
option price held not nominal); see also Bonczek v. Pascoe Equip. Co., 304 Pa. Super. 11, 18,
450 A.2d 75, 80 (1982) (referring to twenty-five percent rule of thumb).
5" See Samoset, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 513; FMA Fin., 590 P.2d at 806.
But see Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Acme Pump Co., 165 Conn. 364, 368, 335 A.2d 294,
295 (1973) (where trial court found true lease, appellate court refused to hold that consider-
ation equal to ten percent of original purchase price was nominal as matter of law to convert
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quacy of consideration is to compare the option price to the aggre-
gate rental payments over the lease term. 9 Option prices ranging
from less than one percent up to ten percent of total rentals have
been held nominal.60
A method frequently utilized in classifying consideration as
nominal or not has been to assess the option price in terms of the
goods' fair market value at the time the option is exercised. 1 Some
courts have looked at the actual value of the property at the time
of exercise in making this comparison.6 2 Others, however, have rec-
ognized that the fair market value reasonably anticipated by the
parties at the time they entered into the transaction should be
considered.6 3 Predictably, no "bright-line percentage" has emerged
transaction into one intended for security).
" See In re Oak Mfg., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1273, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. 277, 283, 194 N.W.2d 775, 780 (1972).
60 See, e.g., In re Washington Processing Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 475, 478-
79 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (option price of ten percent of total rentals created security interest
rather than true lease); James Talcott, 292 Minn. at 283, 194 N.W.2d at 780 (option price of
$2 held nominal as compared to approximately $73,000 total rentals).
In many cases, courts have noted that where the lessee has no sensible alternative to
exercising an option to purchase the leased goods, it is likely that a security interest was
intended by the parties. See, e.g., Percival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc.,
532 F.2d 166, 172 (10th Cir. 1976) (exercising option was only "sensible course of action");
Bonczek, 304 Pa. Super. at 18, 450 A.2d at 80 (same); Tackett v. Mid-Continent Refrigera-
tor Co., 579 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (no sensible alternative existed); FMA
Fin., 590 P.2d at 806 (comparison of option price to sensible alternatives).
6' See Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Or. 573, 576, 500 P.2d 708, 710
(1972) (court considers this standard best one to use in determining nominality of option
price); Tackett, 579 S.W.2d at 548 (same); FMA Fin. Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803,
806 (Utah 1979) (fair market value is most relevant inquiry).
62 See Peco, 262 Or. at 576, 500 P.2d at 710; Tackett, 579 S.W.2d at 548; FMA Fin., 590
P.2d at 805-06.
63 See, e.g., In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1982) (in
addition to actual fair market value of property at end of term, court may look to value
parties anticipated at time lease was signed); Whitworth v. Krueger, 98 Idaho 65, 68, 558
P.2d 1026, 1029 (1976) ($10 option price for cattle which parties anticipated would be worth
over $10,000 held nominal).
One author has suggested that:
The key consideration in determining whether a lease transaction is a true lease or
a disguised secured transaction is whether the price at which the option to
purchase may be exercised is a reasonable approximation of the expected value of
the goods at the time the option is to be exercised or whether it is nominal in
comparison with the expected value of the goods at that time.
E. REILEY, GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.4(h), at 1-24
(1981). The drafters of article 2A also considered a standard of nominality that turned on
the anticipated value of the leased goods. See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 628; infra note 68
and accompanying text.
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as a standard,64 but an option price of ten percent of the value of
the property has been held nominal 5 while a price approximating
fifty percent of the goods' worth has been upheld as substantial.6
Many courts have utilized the fair market value approach, in
conjunction with one or more of the other methods mentioned, to
produce a fair result.6 7 In addition, this standard was the basis for
one of the formulas contemplated by the drafters of article 2A to
clarify the term "nominal consideration."6 8 It is submitted that
this comparison should constitute the primary factor in determin-
ing whether or not consideration given in exchange for goods is
nominal. Since it is unlikely that a bright-line approach will ever
be uniformly espoused, it is suggested that the other existing com-
parisons continue to be used when the option price, as a percent-
age of fair market value, is susceptible to more than one
interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The dramatic growth in the personal property leasing industry
which has taken place in recent years has stimulated a much
needed reevaluation of the applicable law. In the absence of a com-
prehensive and identifiable body of law governing the subject,
principles borrowed from other areas of law, such as real estate,
See Marhoefer, 674 F.2d at 1144.
66 See Peco, 262 Or. at 577, 500 P.2d at 710 (10% option price); see also Percival Con-
str. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 171 (10th Cir. 1976) (10.6% op-
tion price).
68 Marhoefer, 674 F.2d at 1144-45. In instances where no evidence of the goods' fair
market value is presented, some courts have recognized that such information would have
been helpful in determining if consideration is nominal. See, e.g., Granite Equip. Leasing
Corp. v. Acme Pump Co., 165 Conn. 364, 368, 335 A.2d 294, 295 (1973) (evidence of fair
market value would assist court); Tackett v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 579 S.W.2d
545, 548 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (evidence of goods' fair market value provides "best test").
'7 See, e.g., In re Oak Mfg., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(comparisons between option price and total rentals, list price, and fair market value); Peco,
Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Or. 573, 576, 500 P.2d 708, 710 (1972) (comparison of
option price to fair market value and existence of sensible alternatives); FMA Fin. Corp. v.
Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1979) (comparison of option price to cost of prop-
erty, sensible alternatives, and fair market value; all tests relevant).
68 See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 628. The drafters of article 2A considered two for-
mulas which set forth specific artificial percentages to determine what constitutes nominal
consideration. Id. One of contemplated methods was to compare the option price to some
substantial fixed percentage of the "reasonably predictable fair market value" of the goods
at the time the option was to be exercised, with the reasonable prediction to be determined
at the time at which the transaction was entered. Id.
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bailments, sales, and secured transactions, have been applied to
leases in a disorderly manner producing inconsistent and unpre-
dictable results. The drafters of article 2A sought to dispel this
confusion by promulgating uniform rules which would be both ap-
propriate to the nature of the lease transaction and easy to apply.
Many provisions of the new article meet these criteria and should
facilitate the resolution of disputes arising from lease transactions.
This Note has suggested, however, that the sections attempting to
distinguish between true leases and security interests may prove
inadequate. While these provisions represent a marked improve-
ment over their predecessors, it is submitted that more definite
standards are needed, especially the determination of a more accu-
rate definition of what constitutes nominal consideration.
Laura J. Paglia
